Insult in Context: Incorporating Speech Act Theory in Doctrinal Legal Analysis of Interpretative Discussions by Kloosterhuis, H.T.M. (Harm)
Insult in Context: Incorporating Speech Act
Theory in Doctrinal Legal Analysis of
Interpretative Discussions
Harm Kloosterhuis*
Abstract
In this article, I want to show that some doctrinal problems
of legal interpretation and argumentation can be analysed in
a more precise way than a standard doctrinal analysis, when
we use insights from speech act theory and argumentation
theory. Taking a discussion about the accusation of the
criminal act insulting as a starting point, I will try to show
that the doctrinal perspective on meaning of statutory
norms and of the qualification of utterances as legal acts
lacks the instruments to explain why discussions about these
meanings and utterances are so complicated. In short, a
doctrinal analysis focuses on word or sentence meaning, dis-
tinguishing between the literal or semantic meaning on the
one hand and the meaning in context on the other. Howev-
er, the analysis of this ‘meaning in context’ is often rather
vague, especially in cases of indirect and strategic communi-
cation. It is the analysis of this meaning in context that can
profit from insights from speech act theory. I do not want to
‘solve’ the problems of the interpretation of the norms con-
cerning insulting. I only use this case in point as an exempla-
ry example to discuss important (often implicit doctrinal)
starting points about the related concepts meaning and
intention (or commitment) in interpretative discussions.
Keywords: interdisciplinary doctrinal research, interpreta-
tion, argumentation, speech act theory
1 Introduction
This special issue of Erasmus Law Review seeks to
address the question as to how we can translate and
incorporate various non-legal disciplines and their find-
ings into the language of legal doctrine. It is apparently
assumed that other disciplines may provide useful
insights to legal doctrinal research. In this contribution,
I want to help validate this assumption by showing that
some problems of legal interpretation and interpretative
discussions can be analysed in a more precise way than
in a standard doctrinal analysis when we draw on
insights from speech act theory. Taking a discussion
about the accusation of the criminal act insulting as a
starting point, I will try to show that the doctrinal per-
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spective on meaning of statutory norms and of the quali-
fication of utterances as legal acts lacks the instruments
to explain why discussions about these meanings and
utterances are so complicated. In short, a doctrinal anal-
ysis focuses on word or sentence meaning, distinguish-
ing between the literal or semantic meaning on the one
hand and the meaning in context on the other. However,
the analysis of this ‘meaning in context’ is often rather
vague, especially in cases of indirect and strategic commu-
nication. It is the analysis of this meaning in context that
can profit from insights from speech act theory. I do not
want to ‘solve’ the problems of the interpretation of the
norms concerning insulting. I only use this case in point
as an exemplary example to discuss important (often
implicit doctrinal) starting points about the related con-
cepts meaning and intention (or commitment) in inter-
pretative discussions.1
Before I will give an overview of the different parts of
this article, I want to say something about the theoreti-
cal background of this case study and about the close
bond between legal theory and speech act theory. This
relationship goes back to the first publications of H.L.A.
Hart. Already in his inaugural lecture Definition and
Theory in Jurisprudence (1953), Hart defends a contextu-
al analysis of the meaning of legal concepts: ‘We must
take not the word “right” but the sentence “You have a
right” not the word “State” but the sentence “He is a
member or an official of the State.”’2 In the footsteps of
Hart’s analysis, Neil MacCormick and Dick Ruiter used
insights from speech act theory to build a theory of
institutional legal positivism.3 This theory is not only
1. This analysis is an elaboration of my argument defended in H.T.M.
Kloosterhuis, ‘The Logic of Indirect Insulting in Legal Discussions. A
Speech Act Perspective’, in Explorations in Language and Law. An
International, Peer-Reviewed Publication Series (2012) 69, at 82 (Apri-
lia: NOVALOGOS/Ortica editrice soc. coop); and H.T.M. Kloosterhuis,
‘Institutional Constraints of Topical Strategic Maneuvering in Legal
Argumentation. The Case of “Insulting”’, in T. Bustamante and C.
Dahlman (eds.), Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation
(2015) 67, at 75 (New York, NY: Springer).
2. H.L.A Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence (1953) 4, at 5, 16-7
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
3. D.N. MacCormick and O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law.
New Approaches to Legal Positivism (1986) (Dordrecht: Reidel); D.N.
MacCormick, Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory (2007)
(Oxford: Oxford University Press); D.W.P. Ruiter, Institutional Legal
Facts. Legal Powers and Their Effects (1993) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers); and D.W.P. Ruiter, Legal Institutions (2001) (Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
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relevant for the ‘big’ questions of legal philosophy. It
can also be seen as a contribution to the answer of John
Searle’s basic question concerning the construction of
social reality and of institutional facts.4 More recently
Andrei Marmor uses speech act theory to explain prob-
lems of legal interpretation, focusing on the pragmatic
aspects of indirectness in legal language. In several pub-
lications, Marmor shows the fruitfulness of this
approach when analysing implicatures, presuppositions,
and commitments in legal language and strategic lan-
guage use.5 Marmor not only analyses problems of legal
interpretation by using speech act theory, he also uses
this analysis to test and adapt the standard model of this
theory. Marmor rightly states that one of the crucial
starting points of this model is the presumption of cooper-
ation in communication, and he shows that the legal
context offers important examples of strategic communi-
cation.6
My analysis of interpretative discussions about insulting
is also both an application and a test of speech act theo-
ry. The reasoning in this contribution proceeds as fol-
lows. In the first section I will describe the doctrinal
analysis of the interpretative discussions about the accu-
sation of insulting, I will show its problems and I will
sketch the necessary conditions to solve these problems.
As a first step in solving the problems, I will redefine
‘insulting’ in terms of a speech act and I will argue that
there is no direct relation between one of the standard
speech acts and the effect of being insulted. As a second
step, I will show that this relation is an indirect one and
that there is an apparent difference between sentence or
word meaning on the one hand and speaker or utterance
meaning on the other hand. Then – as a final step – I
will demonstrate how this indirect relation creates the
possibility of strategic communication where someone
brings about the effect of an insult and denies the com-
mitment to this effect. With these three steps I want to
show how the doctrinal concept meaning in context can
be clarified and specified with the help of insights of
speech act theory. In the concluding remarks I will
reflect on the results of this analysis in light of the aim
of this issue: incorporating non-legal disciplines in the
doctrinal legal research.
4. ‘How can there be an objective world of money, property, marriage,
governments, elections, football games, cocktail parties, and law courts
in a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force,
and in which some of these particles are organised into systems that are
conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves?’ J.R. Searle and D. Van-
derveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (1985), xi (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
5. A. Marmor, The Language of Law (2014) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press); A. Marmor, ‘Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? – On Some
Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech’, USC Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 09-43 (2009), available at: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract=
1517883>.
6. See also J.J. Lee and S. Pinker, ‘Rationales for Indirect Speech: The
Theory of the Strategic Speaker’, 117 Psychological Review (2010) 785,
at 807; S. Pinker, M.A. Nowak & J.J. Lee, ‘The Logic of Indirect Speech’,
10(3) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 833, at
838 (2008); and S. Pinker, ‘The Evolutionary Social Psychology of Off-
Record Indirect Speech Acts’, 4(4) Intercultural Pragmatics 437, at 4614
(2007).
2 The Problem: The Doctrinal
Analysis of Discussions
about the Accusation of
Insulting
In 10 March 2009, the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands ruled in an important case about the relation
between freedom of speech and the prohibition of
insulting. The case was about Article 137c of the Crimi-
nal Code, which makes insulting statements about a
group of people a crime. The Supreme Court acquitted
a man who stuck a poster in his window with the text
‘Stop the cancer called Islam’ of insulting Muslims.
According to the district court and the court of appeal,
this statement was insulting for a group of people due to
their religion, considering the strong connection
between Islam and its believers. But the Supreme Court
argued that criticising a religion is not automatically also
insulting its followers. According to the Supreme Court
the appeal court gave too wide an interpretation of the
expression ‘a group of people according to their religion’
in Article 137c. People expressing themselves offensive-
ly about a religion are not automatically guilty of insult-
ing its followers, even if the followers feel insulted. The
Supreme Court ruled that ‘the statement must unmis-
takably refer to a certain group of people who differenti-
ate themselves from others by their religion’. While peo-
ple may not insult believers, they can insult their reli-
gion. The sole circumstance of offensive statements
about a religion also insulting its followers is not suffi-
cient to speak of insulting a group of people due to their
religion.
This decision of the Supreme Court incited reactions of
criticism and confusion. In critical reactions, people
wondered why for instance denying the Holocaust is
insulting for Jews and comparing the Islam with cancer
is not insulting for Muslims. And there was confusion
about the distinction made by the Supreme Court: how
is it possible to make a distinction between insulting a
religion (allowed) and insulting members of a religious
community (forbidden)? In his legal comment on the
decision, commentator P.A.M. Mevis criticised this
aspect of the ruling. He argued that the legal qualifica-
tion ‘insulting a group of people because of their reli-
gion’ now depends on the wording chosen. One and the
same insulting effect can be reached with criminal and
non-criminal formulations. Mevis concludes with the
critical question whether this is a desirable result.
This decision of the Supreme Court is only one example
showing the difficulties of interpreting the relevant
Dutch legal norm about insulting. Case law about
insults shows that clear rules about this interpretation
are lacking and that the argumentation is often backed
with rather vague references to ‘the meaning in context’
and ‘the specific circumstances of the case’. This vague-
ness results in uncertainty and – sometimes – in absurd
consequences in case law on this topic. Let me give one
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more example. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that
calling a police officer an ‘ants fucker’ is not an insult.7
But in 2013, the Court of Appeal distinguished from
this decision by ruling that calling a police officer ‘an
ants fucker and an acorn’ – probably because of the spe-
cific circumstances of the case – must be qualified as an
insult.
Now, what could be the explanation for these problems
regarding the interpretation of statutory norms about
insulting? Let us first look at the relevant statutory rule
in the example ‘Stop the cancer called Islam’ in Article
137c of the Dutch Penal Code:
Article 137c
He who publicly, verbally or in writing or image,
deliberately expresses himself in a way insulting of a
group of people because of their race, their religion or
belief, or their hetero- or homosexual nature or their
physical, mental, or intellectual disabilities, will be
punished with a prison sentence of at the most one
year or a fine of third category.
This rule contains the following conditions for the
application: (i) there is an act of insulting of (ii) a group
of people, (iii) there is an intention to insult, (iv) the
insult is in public, (v) verbally or in writing or image,
and (vi) because of race, religion or belief, or hetero- or
homosexual nature or physical, mental, or intellectual
disabilities. These six conditions are developed in case
law. These case law-rules refine and specify the six nec-
essary conditions, but the case law about 137c also resul-
ted in a new condition for the application. According to
the rules from case law about the application of Article
137c, three questions should be answered. The first
question is whether or not an utterance is an insult and
whether or not the other conditions of 137c are fulfilled.
If the utterance is an insult and the other conditions are
fulfilled, the next question is whether or not the utter-
ance is part of a public debate. And if the insult is an
utterance in a public debate the third question is wheth-
er or not the utterance is unnecessary offensive.
Let us now focus on the first question: is the utterance
insulting? The doctrinal answer to this question pro-
ceeds as follows. In order to qualify an utterance as an
insult the words themselves and semantic rules may
often suffice, but often one may require the context to
understand the actual meaning of the words.8 In the
case about the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the Pub-
lic Prosecution explained how these contextual criteria
work in practice:
The words ‘in itself’ mean ‘according to his phraseol-
ogy and in conjunction’. In order to know what
words mean, words themselves may often suffice, but
7. HR 8 mei 2012, LJN BV9188.
8. Of course there are more precise legal definitions for these components
but these often result in new interpretation problems. ‘Insulting’, for
instance, is described as ‘to defile one’s honour’ and ‘honour’ as ‘recog-
nition of moral dignity that every citizen has a right to expect’. These
definitions are also vague and are, therefore, new sources for differen-
ces of opinion about the applicability of Art. 137c.
one may require the rest of the text to understand the
actual meaning of the words. It could be clear, for
instance, that the tone of the entire text is ironic.
Those few words which in isolation may be construed
as insulting, would then in their totality, in conjunc-
tion, be ironic and hence have an entirely different
meaning. ‘Assessment in conjunction’ must be
understood as the interpretation of words within the
bigger picture of the statement; the text, the film or
anything else it may be part of.
What one can expect with these contextual criteria is that
there is room for reasonable disagreement about the
question whether a certain utterance counts as an insult.
In short, the contextual criteria – often in combination
with the ‘criterion’ the ‘specific facts of the case’ – pro-
vide little clarity about the correct application of Article
137c. In my opinion the explanation for this problem is
the doctrinal concept of meaning. The problem with the
doctrinal approach is that questions about meaning are
formulated as problems of sentence or word meaning
(semantics) and that the contextual criteria to provide
little insight in the speaker meaning or utterance meaning
(pragmatics). An adequate explanation for the problems
regarding the analysis of interpretative discussions
about insulting should specify this speaker or utterance
meaning. In the next section I will do that by analysing
the meaning of ‘insulting’ as a speech act. This analysis
results in a theoretical description of insulting incorpo-
ration not only sentence meaning but also intention (or
commitment) a part of the speaker meaning.
3 The Analysis of Insulting as a
Speech Act
The distinction between sentence meaning or word mean-
ing on the one hand and speaker meaning or utterance
meaning on the other is one of the central starting points
of speech act theory.9 Sentence or word meaning is
determined by semantics, syntaxis, and conventions of
language, but speaker or utterance meaning is also rela-
ted to the context and the intentions of the speaker.
Central in the analysis of speaker meaning is the concept
speech act: a form of acting where four acts coincide:10
1. an utterance act: the bringing forth certain speech
sounds, words and sentences,
2. a propositional act: referring to something or some-
one and predicating some properties of that thing or
person,
3. an illocutionary act: investing the utterance with a
communicative force of promise, statement of fact
and so on,
9. J.R. Searle, ‘What Is a Speech Act?’, in J.R. Searle (ed.), The Philosophy
of Language (1971) (London: Oxford); and H.P. Grice, ‘Logic and Con-
versation’, in P. Cole and J.L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3:
Speech Acts (1975) 43, at 58 (New York, NY: Academic Press).
10. Searle, above at n. 9.
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4. a perlocutionary act: bringing about certain interac-
tional effects, such as shock or boredom.
Let us now illustrate these distinctions with the example
of calling a police-officer a homo. The sentence meaning
is related to the propositional act: saying that a person is
a homo, which could be a neutral statement. The speak-
er meaning is related to the illocutionary and the perlo-
cutionary act: the communicative force of the utterance
results in the interactional effect of being insulted.
The next step in the analysis of the speaker meaning of
insulting is answering the question which illocutionary
acts could be connected to the effect of being insulted.
Searle claims that there are five and only five types of
illocutionary acts.
– Assertive illocutionary acts that commit a speaker to
the truth or acceptability of the expressed proposi-
tion, for example making a statement.
– Directive illocutionary acts that are to cause the
hearer to take a particular action, for example
requests, commands and advice.
– Commissive illocutionary acts that commit a speaker
to some future action, for example promises and
oaths.
– Expressive illocutionary acts that express the speak-
er’s attitudes and emotions towards the proposition,
for example congratulations, excuses, and thanks.
– Declarative illocutionary acts that change the reality
in accord with the proposition of the declaration,
for example baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty
or pronouncing someone husband and wife.
The successful performance of an illocutionary act will
always result in the effect that the hearer understands of
the utterance produced by the speaker. But in addition
to the illocutionary effect of understanding, utterances
normally produce and are often intend to produce, fur-
ther perlocutionary effects on the feelings, attitudes, and
subsequent behaviour of the hearers. An assertive
speech act as asserting or argumentation may result in
the perlocutionary effect of convincing or persuasion
and a commissive speech act as a promise may create
expectations. Perlocutionary effects are defined as inten-
ded by the speaker or writer and based on rational
ground by the addressee.11 Within the framework of
speech act theory we are now able to give a more precise
definition of the effect ‘being insulted’:
being insulted is a perlocutionary effect that is intended
by the speaker or writer and that is based on rational
considerations on the part of the addressee.
The next question now is how the perlocutionary effect
of being insulted is related to the five types of illocution-
ary acts. I will argue that there is no direct associated
perlocutionary effect with one of the five illocutionary
acts. (i) The assertive point is to say how things are. (ii)
The directive point is to try to get other people to do
things. (iii) The commissive point is to commit the
speaker to doing something. (iv) The declarative point is
to change the world by saying so. (v) The expressive
point is to express feelings and attitudes. None of these
points is directly connected to the effect of being insul-
ted. How then, in other words, is a language user capa-
ble of inferring an ‘insult’ from an assertion, a promise,
a question, a compliment, or a declaration? In the fol-
lowing I will argue that this connection is indirect.
Let us now, in trying to connect the effect of being
insulted to one or more illocutionary acts, look at some
examples from Dutch case law. According to Dutch case
law the following utterances count as insult:
1. Calling a police-officer a ‘homo’.
2. Greeting a police-officer with ‘Heil Hitler’.
3. Saying ‘I am gonna fuck you’ to a police-officer.
4. Having a tattoo or a bomber jack with the text
‘1312’ or ‘ACAB’ (All Cops Are Bastards).
5. Referring to a passage in the bible where Pilatus
washes his hands.
6. Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not
happen.
These examples illustrate that the direct perlocutionary
effects of these acts are not ‘being insulted’ Calling a
police officer a homo or comparing an employer with
Pontius Pilatus are assertive illocutionary acts, in which
a proposition is presented as representing a state of
11. In other to make clear what this perlocutionary effect involves the fol-
lowing distinctions can be made (F.H. Van Eemeren, Strategic Maneu-
vering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the Pragma-Dialectical
Theory of Argumentation (2010), at 37 (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, PA:
John Benjamins Publishing Company). Van Eemeren distinguishes
between effects of the speech act that are intended by the speaker or
writer and consequences that are brought about accidentally. Van
Eemeren reserves the term act, in contradistinction with ‘mere behav-
iour’, for conscious, purposive activities based on rational considerations
for which the actor can be held accountable. As a result, bringing about
completely unintended consequences cannot be regarded as acting, so
in such cases there can be no question of the performance of perlocu-
tionary acts. According to Van Eemeren a rough and ready criterion for
distinguishing between the performance of perlocutionary acts and the
bringing about of unintended consequences is whether the speaker can
reasonably be asked to provide his/her reasons for causing the conse-
quences in question. Second, Van Eemeren distinguishes between con-
sequences of speech acts whose occurrence may be regarded to be
based on rational considerations on the part of the addressee and con-
sequences that are divorced from reasonable decision-making, like
being startled when someone shouts ‘boo!’.
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affairs, with an associated perlocution as accepting a
description or being convinced, but not being insulted.
Saying ‘I am gonna fuck you’ to a police-officer is a
commissive illocutionary act – a promise or a threat – in
which the speaker commits himself to carrying out an
action. The associated perlocutionary effects of commis-
sives are accepting the promise or being intimidated,
but not being insulted. Greeting a police-officer with
‘Heil Hitler’ is an expressive illocutionary act with an
associated perlocution as accepting the greeting but
again – not being insulted. So there is no direct connec-
tion between the act and the effect of being insulted. In
the next section I will show that this connection is indi-
rect.
4 Insulting as Conversational
Implicatures and the
Possibilities for Strategic
Communication
So, the question now is: how is it possible to derive the
indirect perlocutionary effect ‘being insulted’ from illo-
cutionary acts whose associated perlocutionary effects is
primarily a different one. The key to an answer to this
question is analysing these examples as forms conversa-
tional implicatures as baptised by Grice. In order to ana-
lyse the difference between sentence meaning and
speaker meaning, Grice postulated a general Coopera-
tive Principle and four maxims specifying how to be
cooperative:
– Cooperative Principle. Contribute what is required
by the accepted purpose of the conversation.
– Maxim of Quality. Make your contribution true; so
do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.
– Maxim of Quantity. Make your contribution as
informative as is required for the current purposes
of the exchange. Do not make your contribution
more informative than is required.
– Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.
– Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscur-
ity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and
order.12
According to Grice it is common knowledge that people
generally follow these rules for efficient communication
and, so long as there are no indications to the contrary,
assume that others also adhere to the maxims. Cases in
which the speaker leaves certain elements implicit, yet
the listener still understands what he means over and
above what he ‘literally’ says, can then be explained by
assuming that, in combination with the cooperative
principle, these maxims enable the language users to
convey conversational implicatures. So, if a speaker is
able to adhere to the maxims, yet deliberately and open-
12. Grice, above n. 9, at 26-30.
ly violates one of the maxims, even though there is no
reason to suppose that he has completely abandoned the
cooperative principle, then it is possible to derive a con-
versational implicature. A general pattern for the work-
ing-out of a conversational implicature might be given
as follows:
1. he has said that q;
2. there is no reason to suppose that he is not observ-
ing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Princi-
ple;
3. he could not be doing this unless he thought that p;
4. he knows (and knows that I know that he knows)
that I can see that the supposition that he thinks
that p is required;
5. he has done nothing to stop me thinking that p;
6. he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow
me to think, that p;
7. so he has implicated that p (Grice 1975, p. 31).13
In order to give a more precise description of inferring
conversational implicatures, it is insightful to combine
the maximes of Grice with Searle’s conditions for the
performance of illocutionary acts. For the performance
of an assertive the preparatory conditions are that the
speaker has reasons for acceptance of the truth of the
propositional content and the sincerity condition is
belief. For the performance of a co missive the proposi-
tional content condition is that the propositional content
represents a future course of action of the speaker, the
preparatory condition is that the speaker is able to per-
form this course of action and the sincerity condition is
intention. For the performance of a directive the propo-
sitional content condition is that the propositional con-
tent represents a future course of action of the hearer,
the preparatory condition is that the hearer is able to
perform this course of action and the sincerity condition
is desire. For the performance of a declarative, there are
no special propositional content conditions, the prepara-
tory condition is that the speaker is capable of bringing
about the state of affairs represented in the propositional
content solely in virtue of the performance of the speech
act and the sincerity conditions are belief and desire.
For the performance of an expressive, there are no gen-
eral propositional content, preparatory and sincerity
conditions. But most expressives have propositional
content conditions (you cannot apologise for the law of
modus ponens), the preparatory condition that the propo-
sitional content is true and the sincerity condition about
a state of affairs that the speaker presupposes to obtain.
Let us now try to reconstruct the possible argumenta-
tion about the accusation of insulting in our examples.
The line of reasoning of the public prosecution defend-
ing the standpoint that an utterance counts as an insult
would be as follows.
Someone who calls a police-officer a homo implicates an
insult by openly violating one of the maxims. When the
assertive is not true, the speaker violates the maxime of
quality, or in terms of the conditions for performing an
13. Grice, above n. 9, at 31.
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assertive, the speaker infringes one of the conditions for
performing the assertive. When the assertive is true the
speaker violates the maxime of relevance, or in terms of
the conditions for performing an assertive, the speaker
violates the essential rule, because there is no sense or
point.
The fired employee who compares his employer with
Pontius Pilatus does not say that his dismissal is like the
condemnation of Jesus, but he is implicating it by open-
ly violating the maxime of quality and the conditions for
an assertive illocutionary act.
Someone who greets a police-officer with ‘Heil Hitler’
implicates an insult by openly violating the maxime of
relation, or more precise the sincerity conditions for
performing an expressive illocutionary act. Someone
who promises or threats a police-officer to fuck him
implicates an insult by openly violating the maxime of
quality of relation, or more precise the preparatory and
sincerity conditions for performing a commissive illocu-
tionary act.
Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not happen
counts as an insult because it is (or counts as) a violation
of the maxime of quality. In terms of the conditions for
performing the assertive illocutionary act, this utterance
can be analysed as a violation of the preparatory and
maybe also the sincerity conditions for performing an
assertive illocutionary act.
The examples of indirect insulting illustrate two impor-
tant characteristics of conversational implicatures. The
first is that the presence of the implicature must be
capable of being worked out for even if it can in fact be
intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by
an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not
count as a conversational implicature. The second char-
acteristic is that a conversational implicature is always
contextually cancellable if one can find situations in
which the utterance would simply not carry the implica-
ture.14 In other words, in using an ‘indirect insult’ there
is plausible deniability. These two characteristics are the
explanation for the room for disagreement in discus-
sions about the accusation of an indirect insult. The par-
ty who claims that a certain illocutionary act carries the
implicature ‘insulting’ and the perlocutionary effect
‘being insulted’ claims that there are good arguments for
this standpoint, given the conventional meaning of the
utterance and the conventional rules for conversations.
Because of the plausible deniability the accused can
argue that there was no insult at all. In the examples
mentioned this was precise one of the types of argumen-
tation to defend the standpoint that there was no insult.
Of course this plausible deniability also ‘facilitates’ forms
of strategic communication (or the accusation of strate-
gic communication), because the effect of being insulted
is reached without commitment to this indirect or
implied content.
Let us to illustrate this point take a closer look to the
argumentation in the case ‘Stop the Cancer called
14. H.P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (1989), at 44 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).
Islam’. Is it possible to analyse this utterance as impli-
cating an insult because the writer openly violates one of
the maxims or conditions for performing a directive illo-
cutionary act? The analysis of the utterance as an open
violation of the maxime of quality and the sincerity con-
ditions for the performance of an assertive – Islam is not
a cancer – can easily be countered with the argument
that it was meant metaphorically. The analysis of the
utterance as a violation of the maxime of relation and
the essential condition for an assertive, can be countered
by arguing that this utterance was part of a public
debate. This was in fact the point the defence made in
this case.
It is good to summarise the analysis so far. In light of
the foregoing we can redefine the definition of insulting
as follows. Being insulted is an indirect perlocutionary
effect that is intended by the speaker or writer and that
is based on rational considerations on the part of the
addressee. Because of this indirectness there is always
room for disagreement in actual cases about the accusa-
tion of insulting. This room for disagreement also
involves the possibilities of strategic communication
where someone is achieving an effect like insulting and
can deny the intention to insult or the commitment for
having insulted. In my opinion, this explains the prob-
lems of interpretative discussions about insulting in a
better way than the doctrinal analysis based on the
imprecise concept ‘meaning in context’.
5 Concluding Remarks: The
Relevance for Doctrinal
Legal Research
The central question in this special issue is: how can we
translate and incorporate the various non-legal disci-
plines and their findings into doctrinal legal research? In
this article I tried to contribute to an answer to this cen-
tral question by showing that some doctrinal problems
of legal interpretation and argumentation can be ana-
lysed in a more precise way than a standard doctrinal
analysis, when we use insights from speech act theory. In
these concluding remarks I want to relate my findings to
the aims, the problems, and the methods of doctrinal
legal research.
What are the aims of doctrinal legal research, which
central problems are analysed, and what are the methods
used to solve these problems? According to Taekema,
there are three central characteristics of doctrinal legal
scholarship: the orientation towards legal practice, the
internal perspective taken by legal scholars and the her-
meneutical method used.15 According to Taekema the
close relationship between scholarship and practice and
15. H.S. Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy: A Characterisation of the Discipline
of Law’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method. On
Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011) 33, at 52 (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck).
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its combined descriptive and normative orientation has
two methodological consequences. The first is the inter-
nal perspective to the practice of law. This means that
scholars regard the subject matter of their research from
the same point of view as the people who engage in the
subject. The second consequence is the hermeneutical
method used in doctrinal legal research. In short, this
method is used for interpreting legal texts. It presuppo-
ses that the meaning of a text is not immediately clear
because of a potential problematic interaction between
author, text, reader, and broader context. Taekema con-
cludes that the method of hermeneutics does provide a
solution for solving the interpretation problems, but it
show us that the discourse of interpretation is one of
plausibility rather than on of truth and deduction.
Therefore legal scholarship is necessarily argumentative.
The incorporation of speech act theory in the doctrinal
analysis and the specification of the doctrinal concept of
‘meaning in context’ in terms of speech acts and perlo-
cutionary effects is – as I have tried to show – also char-
acterised by the orientations identified by Taekema.
First I tried to solve practical problems about the inter-
pretation of an article of the Dutch criminal code. I tried
to demonstrate that these problems are the result of the
doctrinal approach to the meaning of words in legal
norms. Although the perspective of ‘meaning in context’
is a good starting point, the doctrinal perspective fails to
give an adequate analysis of speaker meaning and of
indirect communication. As an alternative I proposed to
use the instruments of speech act theory to solve these
problems. Second, this analysis based on speech act
theory takes an (epistemological) internal perspective as
a starting point, because the analysis of speaker meaning
is connected with intentions and commitments and
shared normative expectations in communication.
Third, the analysis shows that there are no easy cases
concerning indirect insulting (and, I think this conclu-
sion can be generalised tot other forms of interpretation
and indirect communication in law). Therefore, this
analysis also illustrates the argumentative character of
legal scholarship.
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